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1. Introduction 
Are labour taxes levied to finance pay-as-you-go pension benefits different from other taxes? 
Specifically, are contributions to the actuarial dimension of the pension system only mandatory 
savings that do not distort labour supply? Disney (2004) argues that contributions to public pension 
programmes may differ from other taxes levied on households because these contributions also 
involve a claim to future benefits. A part of the contribution should thus be perceived by the individual 
and regarded by the analyst as savings. To the extent that a policy change can increase the savings part 
of pension contributions, distortions in the labour market can be reduced – a view outlined in the 
economic literature by among others Lindbeck and Persson (2003), Disney (2004) and Lindbeck 
(2006).  
Recent pension reforms in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Latvia, and Poland, aiming to lower 
implicit tax rates on labour income, have tightened the link between earnings and pension 
entitlements. As long as the average contribution rate to the pension system remains unchanged, this 
offers a partial positive substitution effect on labour supply without any counteracting income effect. 
However, as is well know from the economic literature, efficiency improvements may come at the cost 
of increased inequality.  
While the notions of efficiency and equity are simple in theory, they are not easy to quantify in actual 
public pension schemes. Most pension systems involve complex rules and non-linear features in the 
accumulation of entitlements. For instance, many countries calculate benefits on the basis of the n last 
years or m years with highest labour income. While such a rule is clearly non-actuarial, its 
redistributive effect is far from obvious. If such a rule were to be replaced by a more linear 
accumulation of entitlements, to what extent does it (1) imply a less egalitarian distribution, and (2) 
make the equity-efficiency trade-off more favourable , thereby enabling the realisation of Pareto 
improvement as suggested by the literature? Answers to such questions obviously depend on the 
specific features of the pension scheme in place.  
This paper develops a framework to quantify the efficiency-equity (EE) trade-off in a fully specified 
pension system using dynamic micro-simulation modelling. This methodology allows us to combine 
necessary population heterogeneity with an exact replication of the detailed pension system rules. I 
apply the framework to answer the two questions posed above for five different pension schemes 
applied or being seriously discussed in a Norwegian context. Norway is a particularly interesting case 
since it recently approved a pension reform that aims to improve efficiency and maintain an egalitarian 
distribution of pension benefits while ensuring fiscal sustainability in the face of an ageing population. 
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The analysis thereby allows us to shed some empirical light on the questions raised by the theoretical 
literature.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses analytically the main determinants of the EE 
trade-off within a simple model of overlapping generations. Section 3 briefly presents the 
microsimulation model employed, while section 4 presents the pension schemes under scrutiny. 
Section 5 presents simulation results and the estimated EE trade-off.  Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theoretical background 
Lindbeck and Persson (2003) classify pension systems along two separate dimensions: the degree of 
funding, and the degree of actuarial fairness. In this article, I discuss the implications for efficincy and 
equity of changes in the actuarial properties of the pension system. Increased “efficiency” will in our 
context be equivalent to stronger labour supply incentives through lower effective marginal tax rates 
levied on labour income. By increased “equity” I mean a more compressed distribution of public old-
age benefits. While the starting point of our discussion is a pay-as-you go pension system, the analysis 
and results are equally relevant to any system with funded elements. Changes in the actuarial 
properties will have implications for both the efficiency and equity aspects of the pension system.  
Efficiency 
Using the notation from Lindbeck and Persson (2003), the efficiency dimension of a pay-as-you-go 
pension system can be analysed by a simple two-period overlapping generations model. The first 
period can be thought of as working age and the second period retirement, with periods being of equal 
length. The representative individual of generation t supplies labour tl at wage rate tw to obtain 
income ty in period 1. A contribution rate tτ  levied on labour income is paid to the government, and 
the individual receives a benefit tb in period 2. For simplicity I assume that labour is not supplied in 
period 2 and that the representative individual holds no initial wealth. The return on pension 
contributions paid to government is then: 
(1)  1 t
t t t
breturn
w lτ+ =  
A continuously balanced budget would require 1 1 1 1t t t t t tn b n w l τ+ + + +=  where tn  is the number of 
individuals in generation t. Inserting the balance requirement into (1) gives us: 
(2)  ( )1 1 1 1 1 11 1t t t t t t
t t t t t
n w lreturn G
n w l
τ τ
τ τ
+ + + + +
++ = ≡ +  
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where 1tG +  represents the growth rate of the aggregate wage sum. If 1t tτ τ +=  it also denotes the return 
on the pay-as-you go assets. In this model environment, τ is set exogenously and kept constant across 
generations. Assuming that they are constant over time, I will therefore drop subscripts on τ and G. 
The consumption possibilities of the representative individual are given by the intertemporal budget 
constraint: 
(3)  ( ) ( )2 11 1t t t tc y c R bτ = − − + +   
where R is the real interest rate. Subscripts denote generation whereas superscipts denote period. The 
pension benefit tb  paid to each individual will depend on the specific characteristics of the pension 
system in place. Most systems will in practice contain both a redistributive first-tier benefit and an 
earnings-based insurance benefit. In the general case, the benefit can be described as a function ( )ψ  of 
earnings ( )ty , the contribution rate (τ), return (G) and the actuarial characteristics of the system (α): 
(4)  ( ), , ,t tb y Gψ α τ=  
ψ  can for now be given the very simple functional form: 
(5)  ( ) ( ), , 1 (1 )t ty G b G yψ α α ατ= − + +  
[ ]0,1α ∈  where 0α =  denotes a non-actuarial system and 1α =  a fully actuarial pay-as-you-go 
system. b  represents a flat benefit set endogenously to keep the total benefit level at a constant 
fraction of the total economy. An exogenous increase in α will give a more actuarial system and a 
corresponding endogenous decrease in b . Substituting (4) and (5) into (3) yields 
(6)  ( ) ( )2 111 1 1
1t t t
Gc y c R b
R
τ ατ α + = − + − + + −  +    
This expression shows how the marginal tax on labour income depends on the actuarial properties of 
the pension system. By a tax, measured either on average or on the margin, I mean transfers to 
government net of pension benefits received. In the case where 0α = , the tax wedge in the labour 
market is simply τ. When 1α =  the marginal tax rate is ( )( ) 1R G Rτ − + . In a fully actuarial pay-as-
you-go system, a tax is imposed only by forcing the individual to save at a lower rate of return than the 
market interest rate as we assume that the economy is dynamically efficient. A more actuarial system 
clearly reduces the tax wedge and distortions in the labour market. Although the marginal tax rate 
depends on the actuarial properties of the system, it is worth noting that the average tax rate net of 
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pension benefits is ( )( ) 1R G Rτ − +  for all α. A more actuarial system will therefore improve work 
incentives through the substitution effect without any counteracting income effect, unambiguously 
increasing labour supply. Finally, we note that the general case where (4) does not have a specified 
functional form, the marginal tax rate is expressed by: 
(7)  ( )
1
ty
R
ψτ ′− +  
Equity 
Reaping efficiency gains by making the system more actuarial may come at an equity cost since 
tightening the link between earnings and benefits limits the scope for intra-generational redistribution. 
This EE trade-off can relatively simply be illustrated by introducing some simplistic heterogeneity in a 
population faced with a pension system as specified by equation (5). We assume that the population is 
divided in two equally large groups. Only the group/type one individuals have labour income in period 
1. The consumption of the group/type two individuals only comes through the flat pension benefit b , 
financed by the contribution of the type one individuals in generation 1t + . The credit market is 
perfect, and future benefits may serve as collateral for lending. Increasing α in from 0 to 1, combined 
with plausible parameter values1, gives an equity-efficiency trade-off as illustrated by figure 1. The 
horizontal axis contains the implicit reduction in the marginal contribution rate represented by the 
expression ( )(1 ) 1G Rατ + + . This is equivalent to the second term of equation (7). Note that the 
marginal tax rate reduction does not completely outweigh the contribution rate even when 1α =  since 
R G> . The vertical axis illustrates the GINI coefficient for pension benefits.2 For a population with 
only two types of individuals, its maximum value is 0.5. 
                                                     
1 We assume 25.0=τ and a net interest rate of ( ) ( ) %5.1111 =−++ GR . 
2 In the second period, type 2 individuals receive ( ) ( )0.5 1 1tb y Gτ α= − + and type 1 individuals receive 
( )1tb y Gτα+ + . Insertion into the GINI-coefficient formula gives ( )( )
1
2 1
F R
Gτ
+
+  where F is the implicit reduction in the 
marginal tax rate indicated by the horizontal axis of figure 1.  
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Figure 1: The equity-efficiency trade-off in a stylised model 
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It is worth noting that a reduction in α  does not automatically imply more equity in more complex 
pension systems. Many OECD systems contain non-actuarial elements that turn out to be regressive. 
For instance, the present Norwegian system calculates benefits on the basis of the 20 best income 
years of each individual. An argument for upholding this rule has been to increase benefits for women 
with low labour supply in periods with childcare responsibilities. In practice, however, the rule also 
works to the advantage of career-oriented men with steep age-earning profiles (Koren, 2003). 
Accordingly, pension reform is not limited to movements along the EE-curve. The curve itself may 
shift, depending on the specific benefit function in place (i.e. the functional form of equation (4)).  
Unrealistically, in this framework labour supply is not affected in the trade-off illustrated by Figure 1. 
If labour supply were made endogenous, the curve is not likely to maintain its linear shape.  However, 
the purpose of this paper is confined to describe the labour supply incentives created by the pension 
system. An evaluation of responses should be undertaken as a study in optimal taxation, since it also 
would be necessary to consider the level of other taxes in the economy.  
3. Methodology for estimating the EE trade-off  
Despite the straightforward underlying theory, actually estimating the EE trade-off in a real-world 
pension scheme is an intimidating task. A fully specified pension system typically involves 
complicated benefit rules. The main challenge therefore lies in specifying the pension function ψ  in 
all relevant details. The following three examples illustrate characteristic non-linear elements: 
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1. Public pension schemes that combine redistributive and insurance benefits, usually apply 
means-testing to target benefits. Even a simple means-test would make the specification in (7) 
discontinuous. In fully specified systems, the interplay between earnings-dependent benefits 
and guaranteed benefits is quite complex. 
2. The simple overlapping generations model above treats all period 1 labour income equally. In 
practice, the timing of income during the life cycle is important because benefits are typically 
calculated on the basis of annual income. Rules that place a cap on accumulation years, 
calculations based on best or most recent income years, and annual ceilings for pension-
eligible income introduce non-linearites in the function. 
3. Public pension schemes may also impute pension entitlements for military service, childcare 
responsibility, disability periods, unemployment benefits etc. Such non-income based 
entitlements further complicate the benefit structure.  
These non-linearities inhibit a specification of ψ  as a continuous and differentiable function. For a 
fully specified pension system, my analysis of the equity-efficiency trade-off is therefore limited to 
numerical point estimates. Specifically, to approximate the implicit reduction in the tax rate given by 
the second term of equation (7), I investigate the impact on tb  of a marginal increase in ty . Such 
estimates require a detailed modelling of the pension system rules. In addition, the estimation 
framework must capture population heterogeneity as different parts of the population may face 
different rules, and there may be substantial problems of aggregation in calculating the total effect on 
government budgets of changes in tax or pension systems. To overcome these problems 
microsimulation models, as advocated among others by Orcutt et al. (1986), have become increasingly 
used in the last few decades for analysing the effects of different social and financial policies. The 
basic idea in microsimulation modelling is to represent a socio-economic system by a sample of 
decision units (e.g. persons), and then model the behaviour of these primary units. Contrary to what is 
possible in models with few representative agents, the detailed and complicated tax and benefit rules 
may be exactly reproduced.  
I analyse the present Norwegian public pension, as well as four alternatives that were discussed in the 
preparation of the pension reform approved by the parliament in 2007. To this end I employ the 
dynamic microsimulation model MOSART, which is especially designed to analyse what Gruber and 
Wise (2004) refer to as mechanical effects on individual pension entitlements, benefits and 
government pension expenditures of changes in the pension system. By mechanical effects I mean 
effects ignoring behavioural responses and general equilibrium effects. The model simulates the life 
courses of a representative cross-section of the Norwegian population, emphasizing what is relevant 
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for individuals’ accumulation of public pension entitlements. It captures the following events: 
migration, deaths, births, marriages, divorces, educational activities, retirement and labour force 
participation. Transitions between states over the life course depend on individual characteristics, and 
the transition probabilities have been estimated from observations in a recent period.3 The model 
includes an accurate description of the pension rules and captures all relevant details of the population 
dynamics, as well as the heterogeneity of individual age-earnings profiles and individual public 
pension entitlements. For detailed model documentation, see Fredriksen (1998). 
Figure 2: Structure of the dynamic microsimulation model MOSART 
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3 The analyses in this paper are based on a representative sample from 1993 that is mainly calibrated to the situation in 2001. 
The demographic assumptions are based on Statistics Norway’s demographic projections from December 2005. A total 
fertility rate of 1.8 and a net immigration of 16,000 persons each year imply a gradually diminishing population growth 
measured by the size of each birth cohort. By 2050 the subsequent generation will still be approximately 7 per cent larger. 
The aggregate population may however increase more as a result of a further increase in life expectancy at birth of around 6-
7 years in the same period, and then a further increase towards 2100. Assumptions about participation in the labour force and 
working hours are based on 2001-obervations, while the necessary information about distribution of incomes between 
individuals over the life cycle is based on observations from a longer period. Our exogenous assumptions are fully in line 
with those described in detail by Stensnes, Stølen, and Texmon (2007).  
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4. The pension schemes to be evaluated 
I estimate the EE trade-off in five different pension schemes applied in the Norwegian context. In line 
with Scandinavian welfare state traditions, Norway has a pay-as-you-go public pension system with 
relatively generous replacement rates. The after-tax replacement ratio is about 65 per cent for a person 
with with 40 years of labour market earnings and a steady, normal income level. However, ageing 
combined with the increase in average benefits that come with a maturing pension scheme, will put 
severe pressure on public financed in the decades to come. In April 2007, the Norwegian Parliament 
therefore approved a pension reform that aims to reduce the growth in government pension 
expenditures, improve efficiency by stimulating labour supply, while maintaining an egalitarian 
distribution of pension benefits. This makes Norway a case of particular interest. If the reform 
succeeds with these three intentions, it would seem that policy makers have actually been able to 
accomplish a Pareto improvement by shifting the EE-curve of figure 1 outwards. In addition to 
evaluating the present and reformed pension system, I analyse three rejected proposals that were 
heavily debated in the pension reform process. The proposals differ in their emphasis on the 
redistributive versus insurance-based pension components, universal as opposed to means-tested 
benefits, and the specific accrual scheme for entitlements in place.4 In other words: The schemes are 
intended to have different EE trade-offs. My ambition is to examine to what extent such trade-off 
differences prevail when one accounts for all relevant available information.  
 
The present scheme 
The present pension system combines a first-tier redistributive benefit with a second-tier earnings-
based benefit. The former contains both a universal benefit and a means-tested guarantee that work 
together to provide income security in old age, and the minimum benefit is presently NOK 120 000 
annually5. The latter earnings-based benefit is intended to provide income replacement and based on 
the entitlements each person earns through his or her own working career. In addition, imputed 
entitlements are awarded on the basis of unemployment, disability, and caring responsibilities until the 
youngest child reaches school age. All benefits, entitlements, and entitlement accumulation brackets 
are indexed to average wage growth.  
The official retirement age is 67 years, but a majority of workers leave the labour force earlier by 
means of a disability pension, or through an early retirement scheme that encompasses 60 per cent of 
the workforce. A number of non-linear elements in the present scheme weaken the link between 
                                                     
4 The proposals are also different with respect to retirement incentives. The present system provides heavy subsidies to early 
retirement. In contrast, the reform proposals all aimed to align the social and private costs of retirement through an actuarial 
mechanism that keeps the present value of expected pension benefits independent of retirement age. I leave these feature 
aside in this paper since I only aim to analyse the implicit tax rates on the intensive margin.  
5 At present, 1 EUR is approximately 8 NOK. 
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earnings and entitlement accumulation. In particular, the maximum possible number of accrual years 
is limited to 40, and the second-tier benefit is calculated using the average of the 20 years with highest 
labour market earnings. Details on the rules for accumulating entitlements and calculating pension are 
given in an appendix to this paper. 
 
Principles for pension reform 
The pension reform approved by the Norwegian Parliament is based on the following main principles: 
• The minimum pension benefit is kept at the present level, but entirely transformed into a 
means-tested guarantee.  
• To limit expenditures if life expectancy increases, an actuarial mechanism is introduced to 
reduce annual benefits as the expected length of retirement spells increases. It is possible for 
each individual to counteract the lower benefits by postponing retirement. 
• The statutory retirement age of 67 is replaced by a flexible retirement scheme starting at age 
62. Annual benefits will actuarially reflect retirement age. 
• Entitlements are indexed by wage growth, as in the present system. However, benefits in 
payment are to be indexed by the average of wage and price growth. A special indexation rule 
linked to life expectancy implies that the income guarantee over time will lose value relative 
to the earnings-based benefit.  
• There is to be a tighter link between earnings and pension benefits to improve work 
incentives. Lifelong accumulation of entitlements replaces the present cap on accrual years 
and the principle of calculating benefits on the basis on the best 20 years.  
 
The new system thus means that annual labour incomes below an annual income ceiling are 
accumulated as fictitious capital and converted into an annuity at retirement. The actuarial mechanism 
will, for a given level of entitlements, keep the present value of total pension benefits independent of 
retirement age.6 This is one implementation of what Lindbeck (2006) identifies as an “automatic rule 
mimicking the functioning of actuarially fair private income insurance systems”. The divisor is further 
outlined and discussed in Stensnes and Stølen (2007) and in the detailed pension rules appendix. The 
new system is calibrated so that individuals from 1943-cohort, retiring at age 67 at the introduction of 
the reform in 2010, will receive the same pension benefit as in the existing system. However, life 
expectancy adjustment and lower indexation in payment imply that retirees over time receive lower 
annual benefits than in the present system, unless retirement is postponed. 
                                                     
6 However, special rules imply deviations from an exact actuarial adjustment. For instance, the annual benefits and pension 
premium are independent of gender and other observable characteristics correlated with life expectancy. 
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Alternative accrual schemes for pension reform 
All the alternative proposals seek to preserve both the social security and income replacement 
dimensions of the present system, building on the modifying principles described by the bullet points 
above. The accrual schemes all include a contribution-based pension component whereby annual 
labour income below a threshold is accumulated as fictitious capital, wage indexed and converted into 
an annuity at retirement. Common for the schemes is also a minimum pension continued at the level 
defined by present system. However, the different alternatives are based on a different mix of 
universal benefits, means testing and the income pension that follows from accumulated entitlements. 
Table 1 summarises the model proposals, and further details are given in the appendix. 
The Pension Commission proposal suggests that the minimum pension should be given as a targeted 
guarantee, and reduced against the income-based pension. For pension benefits above 66 thousand 
NOK, the Commission recommended that the reduction rate be softened to 60 percent to ensure that 
also individuals with low income receive pensions in excess of the guaranteed level. The approved 
reform adapts the principles of a targeted guarantee and a uniform accrual rate from the Pension 
Commission proposal, but narrows the benefit range in both ends. At the lower end of the scale, 
tapering of the guaranteed benefit starts already at the first unit of income-earned pensions. Only 
individuals with no accumulated entitlements will therefore become minimum pensioners. At the other 
end of the scale, the annual income ceiling is lowered at the expense of high-income earners. In part, 
this finances an increase in the accrual coefficient. Compared to the Pension Commission and 
Government proposals, the basic pension scheme introduces more equity by way of a universal 
minimum pension benefit. There is no means-testing and accumulated income-based pension benefits 
will always supplement the minimum pension. The breakpoint model is another approach to a more 
egalitarian distribution of pension incomes. A breakpoint is introduced in the accrual coefficient for 
income pensions, so that the accumulation of entitlements is more weighted towards the lower end of 
the income scale. The targeted, guaranteed minimum pension with soft means-testing is adopted from 
the Pension Commission. 
Figure 2 gives an illustration of the incentives faced at different income intervals for the very stylised 
individual with a constant (wage-indexed) income for 43 years. A unit increase in annual income in 
the entire accumulation period, will for different income intervals give an annual increase in pension 
as indicated by the vertical axis. For instance, a marginal income increase each of the 43 years will, 
starting at NOK 300 000 under the Approved Reform, give an increase of the annual pension benefit 
with 0.58 per income unit. Please note that the models may compare differently with a non-constant 
income and fewer accrual years. 
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Table 1. A summary of the alternative pension schemes 
  
Minimum benefit 
(NOK 120 000) 
Earnings-based benefit 
Numbers in per cent and 1000 NOK 
  
  
Universal 
or means-
tested? 
Tapering rate 
(average) 
Lifelong 
earnings 
Accrual 
coefficient
R = 
regressive 
Annual 
income 
interval 
covered 
Actuarial 
retirement 
mechanism 
Indexation 
in payment 
Present 
system Mix 100 % No 
R: 1.05 / 
0.35 % 8-101 No Wage 
Approved 
reform MT 80 % Yes 1.35 % 0-60 Yes Price/Wage
Pension 
commission MT 82 % Yes 1.25 % 0-67 Yes Price/Wage
Basic 
pension 
scheme 
Uni n/a Yes 0.85 % 15-67 Yes Price/Wage
Breakpoint 
model MT 82 % Yes 
R: 1.70 / 
0.80 % 0-67 Yes Price/Wage
 
Figure 2: Labour incentives at different income intervals with 43 accumulation years 
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5. Efficiency-Equity trade-offs 
5.1. The effective tax rate element 
I employ microsimulation to estimate accurately the contribution to the effective marginal tax rate 
levied on labour income from the pension system. Specifically, I expose a cross-section of the model 
population to a small and transitory income shock in one specific period (when t=j).7 Once 
implemented, I run the model to let the individual life courses unfold keeping all individual 
characteristics constant as if the income shock had not taken place. This provides a ceteris paribus 
evaluation of the income shock’s effect on future benefits. Each year of retirement, for every 
individual in the model population, I calculate public pension benefits tb and 
'
tb in parallel. These 
respectively represent the retirement benefit in absence and presence of the transitory income shock 
that the individual was exposed to during working age. The difference between tb  and 
'
tb is measured 
in percentage points, and the marginal tax rate given by equation (7) is accordingly approximated by: 
(8)  ( )'
1 1
1 1
1
tN
t t
i t j
W b b
N R
τ ∞
= = +
+ − − + ∑ ∑ . 
N is the number of individuals in the model population who participate in the labour force at time j.8 W 
here indicates the growth rate of wages. As above, the discount factor ( ) ( )1 1 1R W+ + −  is set to 1.5 
per cent. Choosing a higher discount factor would partially increase the marginal tax rate. Few defined 
benefit systems operate with mechanisms that automatically guarantee the contribution rate to be 
completely fixed across time and invariant to changes in benefit and entitlement schedules. To ensure 
the comparability of the five pension schemes under scrutiny, aggregate pension expenditures have 
been aligned the five schemes using the present system as a numeraire. Details of this alignment 
methodology are given in appendix B. The calculated implicit reduction in the marginal tax rates are 
given by table 2. 
                                                     
7 For convenience, we choose to give the marginal income shock by setting j=2050. Choosing a date so far into the future 
ensures that our results are not affected by the pension reform transition rules. Simulations are then carried out to 2150. The 
income shock is set as large as NOK 10 000 to avoid errors in rounding numbers. 
8 Labour force participation is negatively defined as being above 20 years and not being a recipient of any benefit from the 
National Insurance Scheme. Such benefits are provided for disability, rehabilitation, work-qualifying training and old age. 
The model is run on a representative sample of 1% of the Norwegian population with N approximately equal to 40 000. 
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Table 2: Implicit reduction in marginal tax rates. Percentage points 
Approved reform 15.7 %
Present system 10.1 %
Basic pension scheme 8.1 %
Breakpoint model 13.8 %
Pension Commission proposal 16.2 %
 
We observe that the approved reform and the Pension Commission proposal give the largest reduction 
in the marginal tax rate. The Breakpoint model and the present system proposal follow suit, whereas 
the Basic pension model provide the least reductions. The accrual coefficient intervals and magnitudes 
illustrated by figure 2 are important to understanding outcomes. The Pension Commission proposal 
and approved reform are the most efficient because they have the highest accrual coefficient in the 
income range of most full-time workers, keeping in mind that Norway has a compressed wage 
structure relative to many other countries.  The Pension Commission scores slightly than the approved 
reform because it has a higher income ceiling for entitlement accumulation. The breakpoint model has 
a lower accrual coefficient in the most densely populated income interval, and accordingly scores 
lower. On the other hand, efficiency is improved for those who are faced with a very high coefficient 
in the lower income bracket. This latter element helps insure that the model scores better than the basic 
pension scheme. In addition, in the basic pension scheme, the large income deduction in the 
entitlement accumulations combined with a universal pension benefit represents an inefficient way of 
providing the minimum income guarantee. The poor score of the present system is in part explained by 
a low accrual coefficient in the income range of most full-time workers. Furthermore, the non-
linearties of the present system contribute towards inefficiency.  
5.2. Effects on equity 
My evaluation of the consequences for the intra-generational distribution of old-age benefits is based 
on three important qualifications. First, I consider only pension benefits, neglecting taxes and pension 
premiums. With Norwegian old age pensions being fully funded by general tax receipts, it is not 
possible to identify specific contributions to the system. Adjustments of tax and contribution rates are 
nevertheless likely to have much smaller distributional effects compared to the changes in benefits. 
Second, I analyse only the direct effects of pension reform for a given labour supply, both at the 
intensive and extensive margins. Neglecting indirect income effects caused by behavioural changes 
can be justified when focusing on changes in utility level. According to the envelope theorem, the 
utility of marginal income increases from increased labour supply is neutralized by the utility loss of 
reduced leisure, as long as the individual is free to choose hours worked. Third, I report the 
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distributional effects measured as annual benefits in a cross-section of pensioners without accounting 
for the actuarial adjustment through the flexible pension scheme. This scheme effectively replaces a 
fixed retirement age with an individual retirement choice above 62 years, and the retirement decision 
will influence both retirement age and length. If I included the actuarial implications of this choice, 
annual benefits would be a poor approximation for pension wealth because they would indicate both 
(relevant) changes in pension wealth and (for my purpose irrelevant) changes in retirement spells.  
 
Figure 3: Distributional indicators 
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Figure 3 gives a first impression of how different accrual schemes distribute income between 
individuals at system maturity in 2050. The horizontal axis measures the GINI-coefficient of 
inequality and the vertical axis shows women’s pensions as a share of men’s, on average. Along the 
two dimensions, the upper left quadrant would therefore indicate more equality and lower right more 
inequality. The public old age pension scheme is redistributive, having a much lower GINI-coefficient 
than the cross section of Norwegian labour incomes, due to components such as a minimum benefit 
and the annual income ceiling on accumulating pension entitlements.  
Figure 4 illustrates the benefit profiles of the different accrual schemes more in detail. For the lowest 
25 percentiles, pension incomes will be decided in a complex interplay of minimum benefits and 
means-testing, combined with the accrual coefficient that links lifetime earnings to the income pension 
benefit. The exact combination will influence the curves’ intersection with the vertical axis. The 
continuation of each benefit curve for the middle percentiles should be more transparent as the 
relative slope is proportional to the accrual coefficient. In the breakpoint model, the curve reaches an 
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inflection point just below the 40th percentile as higher incomes are exposed to a reduced accrual 
coefficient.  
 
Figure 4:  Pension benefits in 2050 for different accrual schemes by pension benefit percentile. 
Real 2006-wages in Norwegian kroner serve as a numeraire for the wage-indexed 
benefits 
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The annual income ceiling for pension entitlements will, in combination with the accrual coefficient, 
determine pension benefits for the highest 25 percentiles. The basic pension scheme and the 
breakpoint model have the smallest accrual coefficient, and accordingly the lowest pension benefits 
for this group. The Pension Commission proposal and the Approved reform are the most generous, 
with the former on top. Because the Government has a lower annual income ceiling for the 
accumulation of entitlements than the Pension Commission proposal, the curves cross at the 90th 
percentile. Because of its low accrual coefficient for high incomes, combined with a high deduction in 
the conversion of income to entitlements, the present system provides the lowest benefits for the 
uppermost deciles. For all schemes the curves are convex for the top deciles, because they exhibit an 
increasing gap between the average incomes.  
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5.3 The EE trade-off  
Figure 5 summarises the results by combining the equity and efficiency dimensions. Whereas the 
stylised model allows for a two-dimensional representation of the EE trade-off, as shown in figure 1, 
the actual systems are far too complex to permit such a description. Instead, each pension scheme is 
represented by a single point estimate. In the actual pension schemes under scrutiny, the variations in 
actuarial properties are determined by the joint effect of 10 different parameter values and 2 equations 
(see appendix A for details). No single parameter can be varied to illustrate the EE curves of each 
system. Academic exercises often leave the impression that equity and efficiency are tangible notions 
simply represented by a two-dimensional trade-off. Any solution to the optimal choice problem is then 
a matter of specifying preferences over just these two variables quickly delegated to academics or 
politicians equipped with a set of preferences. The analysis in this paper demonstrates that such a 
simplification may leave a severely misleading impression of the complexities involved in even 
identifying the EE trade-off. The heterogeneity in the range of individual income histories, combined 
with the numerous parameters that determine the pension benefits, is a telling example of this 
complexity. The stylised curve in figure 1 is an effective way of communicating the main ideas, but it 
simply does not have an empirical counterpart. This reflects a more fundamental reality: The more 
heterogeneous are the reform effects on individual labour incentives and incomes, the harder it is 
design reforms that can shift the EE-curve downwards. 
Since the assessments of efficiency and equity are limited to point estimates, it is not possible to 
precisely identify shifts in the curve and the corresponding Pareto improvements discussed in the 
literature. Nevertheless, the exercise justifies at least four valuable conclusions. First, the estimates 
verify the expected correlation between inequality and inefficiency: A move towards a more actuarial 
pension scheme reduces intra-generational redistribution. An interesting exception is the basic pension 
scheme, which could be replaced by the more efficient present system without any increase in the 
GINI-coefficient.  
Second, there is evidence to suggest that the principal cause of inefficiency in the basic pension 
scheme is the strong universal benefit of NOK 120 thousand. The basic pension scheme expands the 
universal pension element found in the present system by removing means-testing entirely. Despite 
eliminating many of the non-linearites in the entitlement accrual function of the present system, in 
particular the cap on accumulation years and the principle of basing pension on the 20 best entitlement 
years, the basic pension scheme delivers lower efficiency than the present system with a universal 
benefit of NOK 67 thousand. Because a universal benefit gives such a strong negative impact on 
efficiency, it seems plausible that its replacement by a fully means-tested income guarantee in the 
three remaining schemes is the main reason why these schemes perform more efficiently. 
Accordingly, removing the entitlement accumulation non-linearities by introducing the principle of 
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lifelong entitlement accumulation may have a smaller impact on our efficiency measure than 
emphasised by policymakers.9  
Third, if the universal benefit is the main driver of inefficiency, Pareto improvements may be realised 
by delivering the income guarantee as a means-tested benefit and using the freed revenue to create 
incentives in the income intervals relevant to large groups of earners. This would be the case for the 
breakpoint model, the Pension Commission proposal, and the Approved reform. A natural extension of 
the view is the notion that the latter schemes lie closer to the EE frontier than the other the present 
system and the basic pension scheme.  Fourth, these results show the importance of estimating the 
equity and efficiency dimensions of a fully specified pension system: Once heterogeneity and pension 
rules are fully accounted for, the predicted Pareto improvements of reform do not materialise in the 
case of the basic pension scheme. In the other schemes, gains seem to stem from a different source 
than advocated by policymakers. 
Figure 5: The EE trade-off in five pension schemes 
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9 The non-linearities may negatively impact on efficiency measured on the extensive margin if they distort retirement 
decisions.  
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6. Conclusions 
I have used a microsimulation framework to quantify the efficiency and equity dimensions of five 
fully specified pension schemes, applied in a Norwegian context. While all combine a redistributive 
first-tier benefit with and an earnings-based insurance benefit, the schemes place different emphasis on 
these components and differ with respect to the specific accrual scheme in place. Keeping the 
contribution rate constant, a move towards a quasi-actuarial pension system will permit a reduction in 
the effective marginal tax rate because contributions involve a claim to future benefits. Efficiency is 
evaluated by estimating the average size of this claim for a marginal increase in labour income, 
discounted to present value. Equity is represented by the GINI-coefficient calculated on the basis of 
pension benefits. My estimates show that increased efficiency in all schemes comes at the expense of 
increased inequality. The results indicate that the pension benefit return to a marginal increase in 
income to an important extent is driven by the way the minimum income guarantee is delivered. Even 
though the GINI-coefficient remains unchanged, the pension scheme with a fully universal benefit has 
lower efficiency than a scheme incorporating an element of means-testing. While the two systems in 
question also differ along other dimensions, these differences a priori work to increase the efficiency 
of the poorly performing scheme. Keeping with this line of argument, a shift towards means-testing at 
the expense of universal benefits should improve the equity-efficiency trade-off. In contrast to the 
notions advocated by policymakers, the principle of lifelong earnings implemented to reduce non-
linearities in scheme for accumulating pension entitlements, seems to be less important. Without the 
detailed modelling of income heterogeneity and benefit rules made possible by our dynamic 
microsimulation approach, these insights would not have been materialised. 
Even though I have identified the marginal tax rate reductions in different pension schemes, the 
consequences for labour market distortions remain contingent on a number of factors. First, labour 
supply will depend on the other taxes in the economy and need to be addressed in an optimal taxation 
framework. To some extent, this analysis needs to address relevant heterogeneity in marginal tax rates 
and labour supply elasticities. Second, actuarial pension contributions represent a claim on a future 
asset subject to individual survival and political risk. Uncertainty may therefore be an important 
element in future analyses. Third, one fundamental justification for public pensions in old age is to 
provide income support to individuals whose myopic behaviour would cause too little savings in 
absence of a pension system. Accordingly, it may seem inconsistent to base efficiency evaluations on 
the discount rates of rational agents. More work is needed before the theoretical labour supply effects 
can be quantified with confidence.  
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Appendix A 
Pension scheme specifications 
Both in the present and reformed system, the Norwegian public pension benefit for old-age pensioners 
will combine a first-tier redistributive element ( b ) with a second-tier earnings-based insurance 
element ( bˆ ). Specified as an annual benefit ( tb ) in year t it is given by the equation: 
(A1)  ( )ˆt tb b bµ= +  
where tµ  is a wage index parameter10 relative to a base year wage 0W , and defined by: 
(A2) 
0
t
t
W
W
µ =  
The redistributive benefit ( b ) can be given as a combination of a universal benefit (u) and an income 
guarantee (g) that is means-tested against the earnings-based benefit ( bˆ ). The minimum pension 
awarded to a person without any accumulated entitlements is then given by the sum u g+ . b  is 
calculated by: 
(A3)  ( ) ( )ˆ ˆmax 0, max 0, min ,t tb u g b d b dλ λ ρ = + − − −   
where tλ  is an indexation parameter, ρ represents the tapering rate of the means-tested guarantee, and 
d a deduction that is fully means tested (i.e. with a tapering rate equal to unity). The earnings-based 
benefit ( bˆ ) is based on annual labour-market earnings ( ty ) in the accumulation period. Earnings are 
each year transformed to a year-specific entitlement ( ˆty ) through the formula:  
(A4)  1 1 1 2 2 2ˆ max 0,min , max 0,min ,t tt
t t
y yy c f c fγ γµ µ
      = − + −               
 
The terms on the RHS represent two entitlement brackets with accrual coefficients 1γ  and 2λ  
respectively, with 1 2γ γ> . The bracket intervals are defined by the floor (f) and ceiling (c) parameters. 
The bracket intervals and annual entitlement ( ˆty ) are, by means of the wage indexation parameter tµ , 
defined in terms of wages in the base year. This is fully equivalent to the parameters c, f and ˆty being 
wage indexed.  
                                                     
10 Wage indexation is the political intention. Historically, however, indexation has been implemented through discretionary 
political decisions whose outcome has tended to favour raising the first-tier benefit (through  increased g) at the expense of 
full wage indexation.  
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In the present system, the benefit is based on the 20 best income years of each individual. 40 years of 
positive earnings are sufficient to achieve maximum accumulation. Let the positive annual 
entitlements of an individual ( ˆty t∀ ) be ordered from high to low in a vector. Let the average of the 
first 20 elements be given by V  and the number of elements by V. In the present system, bˆ  is then 
defined by the expression: 
(A5)  ˆ min(40, )b V V=     (present scheme) 
In the reformed system, the earnings-based benefit is based on lifelong earnings and given by the 
formula:  
(A6)  
1
0
,
ˆ
ˆ
(1 )
A
t
t
t A
K A
y
b π
−
=
−= + ∂
∑
   (reformed schemes) 
where A represents retirement year and K the cohort to which an individual belongs. Even though 
entitlements are wage indexed through the parameter tµ , second-tier benefits in payment are indexed 
by less than wages. The element of price indexation is measured by a fixed deduction π  measured in 
percentage points. ∂  is a parameter relating to the adjustment of annual pension to retirement age and 
longevity. Pension reform will replace a statutory retirement age of 67 years with a flexible retirement 
system starting at age 62. Furthermore, annual benefits in the new system will be lowered (increased) 
if the expected duration of retirement is longer (shorter) than the 1943-cohort retiring at age 67 in 
2010 when the reform is implemented. For a given entitlement level, the present value of expected 
pension benefits are then independent of retirement age and increases in longevity. Specifically, the 
parameter ∂ is defined by: 
(A7)  ,,
1943, 67
K A
K A
K A= =
Φ∂ = Φ  
where Φ  is an expression for the present expected value of a first-year pension benefit of unity for an 
individual of cohort K who retires at age A. Φ  is determined as follows: 
(A8)  , ,
1
1
x A
K A K X
x A
Wp
R
π −∞
=
+ − Φ =  + ∑  
W is expected wage growth and R the expected interest rate. p represents the probability that a person 
of cohort K will survive until the end of the year x, conditional on the individual being alive at age 62. 
These probabilities are to be based on cohort averages, irrespective of sex, and are to be estimated and 
fixed when each cohort is 60 years old (well below the first possible retirement age). Finally, the first-
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tier benefit ( b ) is wage indexed, but with an elements that corrects for changes in life expectancy in 
the reformed system. The gradual reduction of b  relative to bˆ  is meant to provide an additional 
stimulus for postponing retirement. The indexation parameter is formally defined by: 
(A9)  67, 67
1943, 67
K t A
t
K A
λ = − =
= =
Φ= Φ     (reformed schemes) 
In the present system, there is no correction for life expectancy such that the indexation parameter is 
merely given by: 
(A10)  1tλ =    (present scheme) 
The pension schemes analysed in paper may then be defined by the parameter values given in table 1. 
In addition, all schemes provide imputed entitlements for unemployment, disability, and caring 
responsibilities until the youngest child reaches school age. Details of these arrangements may be 
found in Stensnes et al (2007).  
Table 1:  Pension scheme parameters. Please note that the parameters u and g will be 
somewhat reduced for married and cohabiting couples. Values marked with * are 
given in Norwegian 2007-NOK, rouded to the nearest thousand. 2007 also serves as 
the base year. At present, 1 EUR is approximately equal to 8 NOK 
 
 Present 
system 
Approved 
reform 
Pension 
Commission 
proposal 
Basic pension 
scheme 
Breakpoint 
model 
u* 67 000 0 0 120 000 0 
g* 53 000 120 000 120 000 0 120 000 
u+g* 120 000 120 000 120 000 120 000 120 000 
ρ  1 0.8 0.6 0 0.6 
d* 0 0 67 000 0 67 000 
First-tier 
Indexation 
equation A10 A9 A9 A9 A9 
1γ  0.0105 0.0135 0.0125 0.085 0.017 
1f * 67 000 0 0 120 000 0 
1c * 401 000 474 000 534 000 534 000 200 000 
2γ  0.0035 0 0 0 0.008 
2f * 401 000 0 0 0 200 000 
2c * 802 000 0 0 0 534 000 
Benefit 
equation A5 A6 A6 A6 A6 
Second-
tier 
Common 
parameters N/A W=R=1.5%                              π =0.75 
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Appendix B 
Expenditure alignment when the contribution rate is endogenous 
The model presented in section 2 of this paper assumes that contribution rateτ is exogenous and the 
aggregate benefit level endogenously determined as a function of the contribution rate (τ) and wage 
sum growth (G). This assumption does not hold in many real-world pension systems. Instead, benefits 
are determined exogenously whereas the efficient contribution rate, required to keep the budget in 
continual balance, is endogenous. As Disney (2004) points out, even official contribution rates are 
misleading if they do not cover the full costs of the pension scheme. Three main reasons will lead to 
contributions rates becoming endogenous:  
1. Pensions are financed by general tax receipts with no specific contributions made to the 
system. This is the case in for instance Norway, Australia, and New Zealand.  
2. Many countries subsidise the public pensions by budgetary transfers. In some cases this serves 
to finance redistributive first-tier benefits such as income guarantees or imputed pension 
entitlements for unemployment, military service, caring obligations etc. 
3. The pension budget is not continually balanced either because of pre-funding or benefit levels 
that are unsustainable over time. In practice, it is rare to see pay-as-you-go pension systems 
operate with a continually balanced budget.  
Any of these three factors imply that the effective contributions rate is endogenously determined 
according to the balanced budget requirement (B1). Since we abstract from labour supply responses, 
the only practical restriction on τ is that its maximum value is unity. 
(B1)  1
111
1 ≤=
+++
+
ttt
tt
t lwn
bnτ  
An endogenous τ has two implications. First, it means that τ is likely to vary over time and across 
pension systems. One source of such variation is demographic though changes in the support ratio 
( )1t tn n+ , ageing being a relevant example. Another source is shifts in the growth rate of average per 
capita labour income ( )1 1t t t tw l w l+ + . A further source is modifications to the benefit function itself. 
Unless such shocks are perfectly outweighed by continual adjustments the average benefit level ( tb ), 
the contribution rate cannot be held. However, a process of political fine-tuning seems highly unlikely.  
The second implication of an endogenous τ relates to the marginal tax rate of the pension system as 
measured by equation (7): Unless the contribution rate is exogenous, the implicit reduction in tax rates 
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cannot be compared over time and across systems. To see why, consider the case where the simple 
benefit function (5) is inserted into the expression for the marginal tax rate (7): 
(B2)  1
1
1t t
G
R
τ τ α+ +− +  
We observe that marginal tax rate on the labour of income of generation t is determined by the 
contribution rates for both generation t and 1t + . The case where 1t tτ τ+ >  illustrates the expansion of 
the public pension system financed by the working generation at time 1t + , equivalent to the classical 
case where the first generation positively benefits from the introduction of a PAYGO system. The 
expansion will, however, increase the value of the second term even if the actuarial properties of the 
system remain unchanged (α constant). Unless corrected for, this will seriously undermine the value 
of the calculations in the paper, since only the second term can be observed as long as actual 
contributions in period one are not explicitly defined (neither the rax rate tτ  nor the tax base are 
defined in the Norwegian system). If we rely on the information embodied in the second term only and 
the contribution rate were not held constant, a system expansion will appear to lower the marginal tax 
rate. If we had full information to the complete expression, we would see that the marginal tax rate 
actually increases in the latter case.11 In summary: Unless the contribution is kept constant across time 
and pension schemes, system generosity and the savings share cannot be disentangled over time or by 
only looking at the second term of equation (B2). The equation, and in particular its second term, 
would therefore be an incorrect measure of the marginal tax rate and therefore system efficiency: Any 
measure of the actuarial properties of a specific benefit function (ψ ) should be invariant to a scalar 
transformation of that function.  
This result does not mean we must abandon the ambition to empirically compare the efficiency of 
different pension systems, at least as long as the contribution rate is not too different. The calculations 
in this paper employ a method whereby the expenditures of different systems are aligned too keep τ 
constant. Specifically, if we want to compare pension system j to scheme i at time t, we define an 
alignment factor δ as follows: 
(B3) 
jt
it
jt
,1
,1
,1
+
+
+ = τ
τδ  
This factor is then applied to all computed pension benefits for system j ( ,t jb ) such that actual 
payments from the system are given by: 
                                                     
11 This holds for any dynamically efficient economy. The derivative of equation (B2) with respect to τ  can only be non-
positive if ( ) ( )1 1 0G Rα + + ≤ . 
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(B4)   jtitjt bb ,,1,
~
+= δ  
Replacing (B4) and (B3) into (B1) for pension system j gives aligns the contribution rates to system j 
with that of system i: 
(B5)  
jtjtjt
jtjt
jtjtit lwn
bn
,1,1,1
,,
,1,1,1
~
+++
+++ =∂= ττ  
We also note that the approach allows for different support ratios and average per capita earnings 
across systems, which is convenient if such variations result directly from differences in pension 
system rules. Finally, we may now calculate an expression for the marginal tax rate that is constant 
across systems the two systems, where ,k i f= : 
(B6)  
( )
R
ytkkt
kt +
∂− +
1
'
,1
,
ψτ  
It is important to make two clarifications with respect to this methodology. First, the method implicitly 
aligns pension benefits of system j to meet the budget requirements of system i through a uniform 
cut/increase in benefits. If this process were to take place, it is neither obvious nor likely that the 
constraint would be met by uniform cuts. This method is chosen, however, as not to change the 
balance between the savings component and redistributive part of the pension benefits. The GINI 
coefficient of inequality is also invariant to this linear transformation. Second, the methodology only 
corrects for differences in τ across systems, not over time. It is therefore still possible to undertake a 
continual expansion of the pension system successively financed by coming generations. Increased 
generosity in the actuarial part of benefits at time t will reduce the marginal tax rate at time t-1 even if 
pension benefit formula itself remains unchanged. However, the alignment methodology ensures that 
the same expansion over time takes place in all pension schemes under scrutiny, thereby permitting a 
comparison of their actuarial properties.  
 
